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Case No. 20090684-CA-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JONATHAN ALEXANDER MEZA, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from conviction for aggravated robbery, a first, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). * This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient that Defendant threatened to use a 
gun in committing the robbery when, fully masked, he announced, "Open the 
drawer, this is a stickup,"while motioning to his hand, which he kept in his 
pocket until the cash was handed over to him? 
1
 Citation throughout this brief is to the current Code, amendments to 
which following the incident in this case do not affect the disposition of this 
matter on appeal 
Standard of Review. In moving for a directed verdict, Defendant failed to 
specifically challenge that evidence that he threatened to use a dangerous 
weapon in committing the robbery was insufficient. Therefore, because 
Defendant's claim on appeal is unpreserved, it must be reviewed for plain error. 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,119,192 P.3d 867. "[T]o establish plain error [of the 
trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict], a defendant must 
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of 
the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." State v. 
Gill, 2007 UT App 227U, at 1 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 17,10 P.3d 
346). 
STATUTES 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (West Supp. 2010); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-302 (West 2004). R4. At the close of the 
evidence Defendant moved for a directed verdict only on the ground that the 
evidence was insufficient to "tie [him] to the crime." R185:424,452-53. The trial 
-2-
court denied the motion. Id. at 453. The jury convicted Defendant. R157. He 
was sentenced to a five-years-to-life term in the Utah State Prison. Rl 72-71. 
Defendant timely appealed. R175. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
case to this Court. Rl 77. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
On August 3, 2008, DeAnn Price, assistant operations manager was 
working the cashier's counter on the graveyard shift at the Maverick station, 
located just off the freeway, in Springville, Utah. R184:76-81. DeAnn's 
husband, Jeff, was also at the Maverick that morning. Id. at 82,110. A little after 
5:00 am, a man walked into the store and up to the counter, said, "Open the 
drawer, this is a stickup," and demanded money from the cash register. Id. at 
82-83,86-89,113. The man was stockily built, about five foot six-to-eight inches 
tall and had dark eyes and black, curly hair. Id. at 83-86,114-17. He wore a 
black beanie cap, a blue bandana that covered his face from the bridge of his 
nose down, a black shirt with white letters bearing the words, "Insane Clown 
Defendant challenges only the trial court's denial of his motion for a 
directed verdict. Aplt. Br. at 1,12-14, 20-30. Accordingly, the State recites the 
facts in a light most favorable to the verdict. See Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, f 15, 
167 P.3d 503 (noting that"review of the trial court's ruling on the motion for a 
directed verdict and of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict 
involves basically the same analysis"); State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, f 3,144 P.3d 
1152 ("When reviewing a jury verdict, we recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to that verdict/') 
-3-
Posse/' blue levis from which blue underwear protruded from the waist, and 
black and white sneakers with white laces. Id.; Video 1 at 5:11:54 to 5:12:26; 
Video 2 at 5:11:50 to 5:11:52.3 
The man approached the counter and ordered Jeff, "Open the till/' Id. at 
82, 86-87. Jeff explained that because he was not an employee only DeAnn 
could open it. Id. at 87. As DeAnn went to open the cash register, the man—the 
robber — ordered her and Jeff to keep their hands where he could see them. Id. 
The robber kept his right hand in his right pants pocket the whole time and kept 
motioning at his hand. Id. at 87, 102; Video 1 at 5:12:02 to 5:12:15. DeAnn, 
shaking and scared, mistakenly entered the old pass code. When the register 
did not open, the robber became agitated, which frightened DeAnn still more, 
but she successfully entered the correct code on her second try. Id. at 87,102 
She took out all the bills and gave the money— $161 — to the robber, who then 
fled. Id. at 87-89,113. Thirty seconds after the robber left the store, Jeff saw a 
white, four-door car with a black, full-length side molding drive by. Id. at 121-
23,125-26,139-40,143. DeAnn called 911. Id. at 88, 91. When policer officers 
arrived, DeAnn described the robber to them. Id. at 100-01. 
3
 The robber's activities were recorded by three surveillance cameras, 
each placed in a separate location in the store —at the front door, above the 
register, and at the back of the store. Id. at 92; see State's Exhibits 1 and 2 (a 
single CD containing "Video 1" and "Video 2//respectively). 
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DeAnn explained that during the robbery she feared the robber had a gun 
and that "he could really hurt [her]." Id. at 88. Although the robber never 
displayed a gun, she thought he had a gun because of the way he behaved: 
"[H]e kept his hand in his pocket [Video 1 at 5:12:02 to 5:12:15], and he kept 
motioning — ["like tilting his head"] — to his hand like he had a gun," id. at 88-89, 
104,107; he never removed his hand until the robbery was almost complete, id. 
at 106; Video 1 at 5:12:02 to 5:12:15; and, there was a shape in his pocket "that 
looked like a gun." Id. at 103. Jeff, too, feared the robber might have a gun: "He 
kept his hand in his pocket. . . . I wanted to go home, I wanted to see my 
children.... Whatever money he got was not worth my life." Id. at 118-19. 
Police responded to the dispatch reporting the robbery and describing the 
robber and his car. Id. at 165,168-70. The dispatcher also stated that the robber 
had a gun. Id. at 170. A search of the area around the Maverick station failed to 
turn up any evidence. Id. at 172. 
Responding to the dispatch, a police officer stopped Defendant at 10:20 
p.m. the same day, as he drove his car, a gold Saturn. Id. at 154,157-58,199-200; 
R185:244-45. With Defendant were Dustin Hoerner and Trevor Elison. Id. at 
158. Defendant was wearing a black beanie cap and a black shirt that the officer 
believed was embossed with an Insane Clown Posse clown. Id. at 159,172. A 
search of the car uncovered a pair of black and white shoes with white laces and 
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a pair of blue jeans. Id. at 160, 207-10. The officer who had responded to the 
dispatch later confirmed the physical similarity between the robber, as described 
to him at the Maverick, and Defendant, when he later interviewed Defendant at 
the police station. He particularly noted comparisons in Defendant's and the 
robber's age, apparel, and physical description. Id. at 172,176-78. 
Defendant told this officer that during the time of the robbery he had been 
at his girlfriend's, Cora Gaudio's, house. Id. at 179-80, 227. Gaudio, however, 
testified that she had been mistaken in initially corroborating Defendant's alibi, 
and that, after reconstructing events of the period, it was actually the day after 
the robbery that Defendant was with her. R185:387,400-02,406. She repeatedly 
testified that Defendant had not been with her on August 3. Id. at 410-13. 
Another officer dusted the counter at the Maverick for fingerprints and 
removed a latent, partial palm print. Id. at 190,196. Defendant told that officer 
that he had not been at the Maverick station and had no involvement with the 
robbery. Id. at 205. Defendant asserted that had gone swimming with friends — 
Trevor Elison and Dustin Hoerner—at Deer Creek on the day of the robbery. Id. 
at 205-06. 
The officer also executed a search warrant at Defendant's and Gaudio's 
apartment. Id. at 212-13. A search of the house uncovered a black cap and a 
black Insane Clown Posse T-shirt. Id. at 213-15. 
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The officer also went to Elison's house, where he found a white, four-door 
car with a black molding strip. Id. at 219-20. The car belonged to Hoerner. Id. at 
222. Search warrants were obtained for both Elison's house and Hoerner's car. 
Id. at 221. A search of the car uncovered a trunk filled with Insane Clown Posse 
shirts. Id. at 222-23. The officer also found a black, still-tied bandana with a 
white design on it. Id. The officer acknowledged, however, that none of the T-
shirts recovered in any of the searches matched the T-shirt worn by the robber, 
as depicted in the video. R184:216-19, 222-26;R185:248-49. And while each of 
the items uncovered by the searches were not unique, the officer found that a 
suspect having all of those items was "of great interest." R185:261. 
Trenton Grandy, certified fingerprint examiner with the Utah Bureau of 
Forensic Services, examined the latent palm print taken from the Maverick 
station. R185:262-63,284-87. He determined that the print was legible and that 
it had twenty-six characteristics, including a scar, in common with Defendant's 
palm print, and Id. at 287-88,292-94,315-16,324,353. Grandy was "100 percent 
positive" that the palm print from the Maverick station was made by Defendant. 
Id. at 315-16. In a blind verication examination—an independent analysis — 
Alisa Farmer, another certified fingerprint examiner with the Utah Bureau of 
Forensic Services, confirmed Grandy's results: the "known print and the 
questioned print were produced by the same person." Id. at 316-17,360-62,364-
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69. Ms. Farmer, too, was "absolutely comfortable" with her conclusion. Id. at 
369. 
James Gaskill, a retired professor of forensic science at Weber State 
University and who was neither a fingerprint specialist nor a certified latent 
fingerprint examiner, testified for the defense that he did not think the quality of 
the latent palm print was adequate to comfortably determine whether it 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a 
directed verdict and plainly erred in not reducing his conviction to simple 
robbery after the verdict. In moving for a directed verdict, however, Defendant 
failed to specifically alert the trial court to the specific issue he now raises on 
appeal— that evidence that he threatened to use a dangerous weapon in 
committing the robbery was insufficient. Therefore, because Defendant's 
directed verdict claim on appeal is unpreserved, it, like his reduction of 
conviction claim, must be reviewed for plain error. Under that standard, 
Defendant must essentially show that there was no evidence that he threatened, 
by word or deed, to use a dangerous weapon. The record amply shows that 
Defendant cannot satisfy that demanding burden. 
Viewed most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Defendant 
entered the Maverick station fully masked and, while demanding money from 
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the cash drawer, annoimced, "This is a stickup." Throughout the brief 
encounter, until just before he seized the cash from the clerk, Defendant kept his 
right hand in his pocket, which appeared to contain a bulge in the shape of a 
gun, constantly motioning to it with his head. All of this conduct and 
Defendant's intimidating announcement reasonably led the victims to believe 
that Defendant was in control of a gun, that he would use if his requests were 
not complied with, and that their lives and well-being were at risk. As such, 
Defendant fails to show that the court committed plain error in refusing to grant 
his motion for a directed verdict or to reduce his conviction to simple robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT THAT DEFENDANT 
THREATENED TO USE A GUN IN COMMITTING THE 
ROBBERY WHEN, FULLY MASKED, HE ANNOUNCED, 
"OPEN THE DRAWER, THIS IS A STICKUP," WHILE 
MOTIONING TO HIS HAND, WHICH HE KEPT IN HIS 
POCKET UNTIL THE CASH WAS HANDED OVER TO HIM 
Defendant challenges his conviction for aggravated robbery both as a 
challenge to the trial court's denial of his directed verdict motion and as a 
challenge to the conviction, on the on the ground that the trial court erred in 
failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict. Aplt. Br. at Pt. I & II. 
Defendant concedes that the evidence was sufficient that he committed the 
robbery. See Aplt. Br. at 13,40. He argues only that "the evidence, even viewed 
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in a light most favorable to the verdict, does not support a reasonable basis upon 
which the jury could have found that [he] used or threatened to use a dangerous 
weapon in the course of a robbery/' Aplt. Br. at Pt. 1,20. Based on this alleged 
insufficiency, Defendant claims that the trial ocurt should have either granted 
his directed verdict motion at the close of evidence, or reduced his conviction to 
simple robbery after the jury's verdict. Defendant's insufficiency claim, 
however, is meritless. 
A, Because Defendant did not preserve his sufficiency claim 
below, Defendant succeeds only if he can show plain error. 
"'Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at 
trial] in order to preserve an issue for appeal.'" Low, 2008 UT 58, f 17 (quoting 
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ]f 14, 128 P.3d 1171 (additional citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). The preservation rule fully applies to a claim that the 
evidence was insufficient to send the case to the jury. See e.g., Gill, 2007 UT App 
227U, at 1 (citing Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f t 16-17). "'Utah courts require specific 
objections in order to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give 
the court an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.'" Id. (quoting State 
v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). '"Where there is no clear or specific objection and the specific ground 
for objection is not clear from the context[,] the theory cannot be raised on 
appeal.'" Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, t 13, 129 P.3d 282 
-10-
(internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, if a party makes an objection at trial 
based on one ground, this objection does not preserve for appeal any alternative 
grounds for objection/' Id. 
Here, Defendant did just that. At the close of all the evidence, Defendant 
cursorily moved for a directed verdict only on the ground that the evidence was 
insufficient to "tie [him] to the crime/' obviously referring to the State's 
evidence identifying him as the masked robber. R185:424,452-53. He made no 
claim at all that the State's evidence failed to show that he threatened to use a 
dangerous weapon in committing the robbery. Id. Defendant's motion, 
therefore, could not have sufficiently brought the error now claimed on appeal 
"to the trial court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the 
errors if appropriate." State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, f 17. And Defendant never 
asked the court to reduce his conviction to simple robbery after the jury's 
verdict. Thus, Defendant's insufficiency claim on appeal is unpreserved. 
"When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, [the reviewing court] 
will address the issue only if... the appellant establishes that the district court 
committed'plain error.'" Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 19.4 "[T]o establish plain error [of 
Other exceptions to the preservation rule permitting review of an 
unpreserved claim may arise when "'exceptional circumstances' exist, or . . . in 
some situations, if the appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in failing to preserve the issue." Low, 2008 UT 58, | 19 (citations omitted). 
Defendant does not argue for review under these rubrics. 
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the trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict], a defendant must 
demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of 
the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Gill, 
2007 UT App 227U, at 1 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,117.) To illustrate 
when an evidentiary defect would be "so obvious and fundamental that it 
would be plain error for the trial court not to discharge the defendant/' the 
Holgate court suggested the following example: "the case in which the State 
presents no evidence to support an essential element of a criminal charge." 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,117 (emphasis in original). 
Because the record evidence amply shows that he did signal that he 
possessed and threatened to use a dangerous weapon, Defendant's plain error 
claim fails. 
B. Because the evidence amply sufficed to show that Defendant 
used a dangerous weapon during the robbery, Defendant's 
claims fail under the plain error standard. 
"A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he . . . threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601[.]" UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302(1)(a) (West 2004). Here, Defendant only 
-12-
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the dangerous weapon 
element. His challenge fails under the plain error standard. 
" A threat is defined as the expression of an intention to inflict injury on 
another/' State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d 544,546 (Utah 1989) (citing Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary (1976)). A '"dangerous weapon' means . . . a . . . 
representation of [an] item [capable of causing death or serious bodily injury], if 
. . . the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is 
in control of such an item/' or "the actor's use or apparent intended use of the 
item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (5)(a), -(b) (WestSupp. 2010). 
Implicit in the legislature's definition of "dangerous weapon" is the legislature's 
intent to make an actor's threatening representation that he controls a weapon 
reasonably believed to be dangerous an aggravating factor even if the actor does 
not, in fact, possess the weapon. Thus, this court has held that "'threatening to 
use a dangerous weapon during the commission of a robbery, regardless of 
whether one actually possesses such a weapon, is sufficient for a charge of 
-13-
aggravated robbery/77 State v. Reyos, 2004 UT App 151, f 4,91 R3d 86 (quoting 
State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310,313 (Utah App. 1992)).5 
It cannot be disputed that a gun is an item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury. See e.g., Adams, 830 P.2d at 313 (holding threat to shoot 
robbery victim with a gun satisfied aggravating factor—"threatening] to use a 
dangerous weapon") (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302); State v. Ireland, 2005 
UT App 209, f 12, 113 P.3d 1028 ("Guns by their very nature are capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury.") Thus, resolution of whether the 
evidence was sufficient to prove aggravated robbery in this case turns on 
whether Defendant's words and actions constituted a representation that he 
controlled a gun or that he apparently intended to use the gun in a way likely to 
5
 In raising his sufficiency claim, Defendant posits that his claim entails 
an issue of the proper interpretation of statutes providing for aggravated 
robbery and the definition of a "dangerous weapon." Aplt. Br. at 1,12-14. In 
support of this theory, Defendant discusses cases decided prior to the 1989 
amendment of both statutes, applicable to this case. Aplt. Br. at 14-16. See State 
v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961,963-65 (Utah 1987) (then-effective aggravated robbery 
statute did not incorporate definition of dangerous weapon that included actor's 
representation, verbally or by conduct, that actor was in control of a dangerous 
weapon; thus, evidence that defendant acted as though he had gun which he 
threatened to use held insufficient), superseded by statute as stated in State v. 
Ireland, 2006 UT 82,150 P.3d 532; State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 657 (Utah 1989) 
(same). The plain language of the amended statutes, however, makes clear the 
unambiguous relation of the elements of the aggravated robbery and the 
definition of a dangerous weapon to the facts of this case. See Aple. Br. at LB. 
Thus, the State declines any invitation to address Defendant's appeal as 
anything other than a plain-vanilla sufficiency-of-evidence claim. See id. 
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cause the Maverick clerks to reasonably believe they were at risk of death or 
serious bodily injury. And, as stated, this Court has held that the evidence is 
sufficient if the actor verbally threatened to use a gun, even in the absence of 
any evidence that the actor actually possessed a gun. See Reyos, 2004 UT App 
151,1 4. 
In Reyos, Reyos robbed a store, and store employees and bystanders 
chased him. Id. at Tf 3. When cornered, Reyos yelled to his brother, "Get the 
gun and shoot/' and "shoot to kill," words which immediately scattered the 
crowd as it ran for protection. Id. On appeal, Reyos challenged his conviction 
for aggravated robbery, which was based on his threat to use a dangerous 
weapon. Id. at % 2. He argued that "his statement still was no real threat to 
anyone because he was not in possession of a weapon, or even capable of 
gaining possession of a weapon at the time he made the statements." Id. at f 4. 
This Court rejected Reyos's argument. Id. The Court concluded that 
Reyos words constituted a genuine threat to use a dangerous weapon; otherwise 
the crowd would have disregarded it. Id. at | 3. The Court then elaborated, 
observing that "'threats to use a dangerous weapon are particularly terrifying 
whether or not the perpetrator actually possesses a weapon.'" Id. at f 4 (quoting 
Hartmann, 783 P.2d at 547). "Additionally," the Court noted, "a representation 
of a dangerous weapon may include 'a statement conveying an impression for 
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the purpose of influencing action/" Id. (quoting State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 
278 (Utah App. 1995)). The Court concluded that "Reyos's statements to 'get the 
gun and shoot' and 'shoot to kill' clearly 'conveyed an impression' that a gun 
would be used 'for the purpose of influencing action.'" Id. (citing Candelario, 909 
P.2d at 278). Thus, this Court held, the threat was sufficient to support Reyos's 
conviction for aggravated robbery, without the need to show that he had actual 
possession of a gun at the time of his threat. Id. 
Ireland further illustrates how a non-verbal threat to use a gun will suffice 
to prove aggravated robbery. 2005 UT App 209, ^ 9-11. Ireland entered a 
jewelry store and demanded from the clerk all the money from the cash drawer. 
Id. at Tf 2. As he made his demand, Ireland pointed with his right hand, which 
he kept concealed in his coat pocket and held close to his side with his elbow 
extending behind him. Id. Ireland did not say he had a gun, and the clerk did 
not see a gun. Id. But based on Ireland's gestures, however, the clerk believed 
that Ireland might have a gun and that he might be shot if he did not comply 
with Ireland's requests. Id. 
On appeal, Ireland argued that the pointing gesture inside his coat pocket 
did not constitute a "representation," because it was not verbal. Id. at f 9. 
Holding that "the statute does not require a 'representation' to be verbal, but 
rather includes nonverbal gestures," the Court rejected Ireland's claim. Id. It 
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determined that Ireland's gestures constituted a representation of a dangerous 
weapon "because such gesture was intended to look like a gun for the purpose 
of influencing [the clerk] to give Ireland all of the cash in the cash drawer." Id. 
at 111. 
The court further held, as an independent ground of Ireland's use of a 
dangerous weapon, that Ireland's gestures reasonably caused the clerk to 
believe that the "item [was] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury/' 
Id. at % 12. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-l-601(5)(b)(i) (2004)). The clerk's belief, 
the Court held, was reasonably based not only on his subjective belief that 
Ireland had a gun, but also on the objective evidence of Ireland's suggestive 
gestures, all of which supported a reasonable belief that there existed the risk of 
injury if he did not comply with Ireland's demands. Id. 
Reyos and Ireland are dispositive of this case. Here, Defendant entered the 
Maverick fully masked, a costume likely to cause fear on sight. Defendant 
immediately demanded cash from the till, announcing, "This is a stickup." That 
announcement, like the robber's in Reyos, clearly signaled that Defendant was in 
control of a gun, an indisputably dangerous weapon. See Ireland, 2005 UT App 
209, % 12. A "stickup" is a synonym for a "holdup," which is "a robbery at the 
point of a gun." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1079, 2242 
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(1993).6 Accordingly, Defendant's announcement was both (1) a statement that 
he was in control of a dangerous weapon and (2) a statement, when coupled 
with the unprivileged demand for cash from the till, that would "lead[] the 
victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-601 (5)(a), -(b) (West Supp. 2010). As such, 
Defendant's announcement in the circumstances of the encounter was 
intrinsically threatening. See Hartmann, 783 P.2d at 546 ("A threat is defined as 
the expression of an intention to inflict injury on another.") (citation omitted). 
Indeed, Defendant's threatening announcement, given the situation, sufficed to 
show that the robbery was aggravated, even though Defendant was never found 
to possess a gun. R184:172. See e.g., People v. Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55,61 (Mich. Ct. 
6
 Indeed, so exclusively identified are the terms "stickup" and "holdup" 
to an offense accomplished with the aid of a firearm, that the State has not 
uncovered a nonconforming case in Utah's entire jurisprudence. See State v. 
Galli, 967 P.2d 930,932 (Utah 1998); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666,675 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251,1251,1254 (Utah 1984), abrogation on unrelated 
matter recognized by State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103; State v. 
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1982), abrogation on unrelated matter 
recognized by State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991); State v. Cummins, 27 Utah 
2d 365,496 P.2d 709,709-10 (Utah 1972); State v. Jordan, 26 Utah 2d 240,487 P.2d 
1281,1284 (Utah 1971); State v. George, 8 Utah 2d 172, 330 P.2d 493, 493 (Utah 
1958); State v. Neal, 123 Utah 93,254 P.2d 1053,1055 (Utah 1953); State v. Seyboldt, 
65 Utah 204, 236 P. 225, 233 (Utah 1925); Westerdahl v. State Ins. Fund, 60 Utah 
325,208 P. 494,494 (Utah 1922); State v. Hill, 44 Utah 79,138 P. 1149,1150 (Utah 
1914); Herald-Republican Pub. Co. v. Lewis, 42 Utah 188, 129 P. 624, 626 (Utah 
1913); State v. Riley, 41 Utah 225,126 P. 294,296-97 (Utah 1911); State v. Morgan, 
22 Utah 162, 61 P. 527, 528 (Utah 1900). 
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App. 2001) (holding complainant's belief reasonable that actor possessed a gun 
or other dangerous weapon upon showing that actor reached for bulge in his 
jacket as he announced, "This is a stickup"). 
But even if Defendant's announcement—'This is a stickup7'— is 
insufficient by itself to prove that Defendant threatened to use a dangerous 
weapon, it becomes sufficient when coupled with additional objective evidence 
that Defendant was in control of a gun and that Defendant's apparent use of a 
dangerous weapon would likely lead the Prices to believe they were at risk of 
death or serious bodily injury. As Defendant ordered DeAnn to open the cash 
register and ordered her and Jeff keep their hands where he could see them, he 
kept his right hand in his right pants pocket, which appeared to DeAnn to 
contain a bulge in the shape of a gun. R184:87,102-03. Moreover, Defendant 
kept his right hand in his pocket throughout the entire encounter until he 
collected the cash from the till. Id. at 106; Video 1 at 5:12:02 to 5:12:15. And 
throughout the robbery, Defendant kept motioning at his hand. Id. at 87,102.7 
7
 State recognizes that the motions to which DeAnn referred are not 
readily visible on the video. Video 1 at 5:12:02 to 5:12:15. The video does, 
however, fully confirm that Defendant kept his hand in pocket, beneath the 
counter, throughout the robbery until he collected the cash from DeAnn. Id. 
Notwithstanding this discrepancy and recognizing that the evidence must be 
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, Defendant essentially concedes 
the facts testified to by DeAnn and Jeff: "[The robber] merely held his hand in 
his pocket where the victim may have seen the shape of a gun and motioned 
with his head toward his hand." Aplt. Br. at 37-38. 
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Those actions led both DeAnn and Jeff to fear that Defendant had a gun and to 
fear for their lives. Id. at 88-89,104,107. DeAnn testified that, based on her 
belief that she was being confronted with a gun, she believed that "[the robber] 
could really hurt [her]," a fear patent in her actions demonstrable on the video 
and her frightened initial misentry of the pass code to the cash drawer. Id. at 87-
88,102; Video 1 at 5:12:02 to 5:12:15. Jeff similarly testified, "[The robber] kept 
his hand in his pocket Whatever money he got was not worth my life/' Id. 
at 118-19. Under the circumstances, the Prices' fear for their well-being was 
reasonable. Ireland, 205 UT App 209, % 12. 
In sum, there was ample evidence that Defendant threatened to use a 
dangerous weapon in committing the robbery at the Maverick station. Through 
word and action, his communicated that he controlled a gun and that he would 
use it, instilling in his victims the reasonable belief that their lives and well being 
were at serious risk. Because there exists ample evidence of the aggravating 
factor, Defendant's claim cannot survive the plain error test. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-1-601 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*SChapter 1. General Provisions f Refs & Annos) 
l iPar t 6. Definitions 
• •§ 76 -1 -601 . Definitions 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the 
item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such 
an item. 
(6) "Grievous sexual offense" means: 
(a) rape, Section 76-5-402; 
(b) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1: 
(c) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2: 
(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3: 
(e) forcible sodomy, Subsection 76-5-403(2); 
(f) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1: 
(9) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Subsection 76-5-404.1(4); 
(h) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405: 
(i) any felony attempt to commit an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) through (h); or 
(j) an offense in another state, territory, or district of the United States that, if committed in 
Utah, would constitute an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) through (i). 
(7) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(8) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of 
acting. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or 
unincorporated association. 
(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control over 
tangible property. 
(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
(12) "bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or 
causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ. 
(13) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing information in a form 
capable of being preserved. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-601; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 1; Laws 1995. c. 244, S 1. eff. May 1, 
1995; Laws 1995, c. 291, S 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 205. § 26. eff. April 29, 1996: 
Laws 2007, c. 339, 5 2, eff. April 30. 2007. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2007, c. 339, in subsec. (5)(b) substituted ", if" fo r " ; and"; inserted subsec. (6) and 
redesignated former subsecs. (6) through (12) as subsecs. (7) through (13). 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
"HChapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
^iPart 3. Robbery 
• •§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1- 601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a 
robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51 , § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 1994, c. 
271, 5 1: Laws 2003, c. 62, 5 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2003, c. 62, inserted in subsec. ( l ) (c) "or attempts to take". 
